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INVESTING INTO THE ABYSS: THE CONTINUED MISCLASSIFICATION 
OF MULTI-SECTOR MANAGED FUNDS 
 
N. Allen2, K. Phoon3, J. Watson1,2, J. Wickramanayake2 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess whether Australian multi-sector managed funds are 
misclassified, and then, having found this to be the case, determine if this misclassification has any 
impact on fund performance. In this research we adopt a strong form of returns based style analysis 
to investigate a monthly sample of Australian multi-sector funds over the five-year sample period 
2003:04-2008:03. The evidence provided demonstrates that insufficient attention has been paid as to 
whether fund managers are able to keep within their tactical asset allocation ranges and presents that 
misclassification exist for Australian multi-sector managed funds but that the effect on fund 
performance is not significant. Additional areas of interest worthy of further attention but not 
investigated within this paper include extending the work to investigate additional fund types 
(including superannuation) to determine if the results hold once funds are overexposed to certain 
asset classes in bullish and bearish market conditions. We find the current system of classification of 
managed funds on the basis of their stated objectives has significant room for improvement. Our 
findings demonstrate a lack of association, and the implication to investors is that, misclassification 
may not be a significant reason for fund underperformance. The paper adds to the literature by 
demonstrating that no association exists between misclassification and fund performance.  
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I Introduction 
The stated investment objective or “style” of a managed fund is an important factor in aiding the 
decision making process for an investor. However, growing evidence suggests that many funds fail 
to adhere to consistent style profiles and “funds are misclassified” over time (Brown and Goetzmann 
1997). In this study, consistent with popular opinion, a fund is deemed to be “misclassified” when a 
fund allocates outside its stated range as disclosed within their product disclosure statement (PDS) 
and thus is identified as breaking its mandate (Kim, Shukla and Tomas, 2000). Notably Brown, 
Harlow and Zhang (2009) show that failure to abide by a consistent style ultimately can lead to 
inferior performance.  
The performance evaluation literature demonstrates that misclassification can impact 
negatively on investors in various ways. (1) Investors are exposed to unforseen risks and therefore 
are unable to achieve personal investment goals as a result of the fund manager going outside of the 
mandated range for a particular asset class. This has never been more important given the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the turbulent nature of the markets as a result of the fallout from the 
sub-prime collapse. (2) Misclassification may also have negative effects on fund performance. 
Existing studies have suggested that fund mangers who operate with an inconsistent style to that 
mandated within PDS are more likely to make asset allocation errors, have higher turnover and have 
overall poor performance compared to peer funds (Brown et al. 2009; Gallo, Phengpis, and Swanson 
2007). As a result of the disadvantages identified in the literature, the current market turbulence and 
lack of existing empirical evidence with respect to the impact of misclassification on performance, 
the question of whether funds in Australia are misclassified is topical and worthy of further attention. 
  Reasons for why misclassification occurs have been previously investigated (Anderson and 
Ahmed 2005). The most persuasive argument is that fund managers try to time the market in certain 
sectors and asset classes by shifting their allocations into them regardless of a fund’s stipulated 
mandate. A limitation of the existing literature is that most of the early work in this area has focused 
on US equity funds (Dibartolomeo and Witowski 1997; Christopherson 1995). Some recent studies 
in Australia have extended the earlier work by focusing on multi-sector funds (Holmes and Faff 
2008a, 2008b). These types of funds are worthy of investigation given many investors choose from 
among multi-sector funds in order to achieve their long term retirement objectives (Benson, 
Gallagher and Teodorowski 2007; Brinson, Singer and Beebower 1991). Multi-sector funds 
specialise in investing across a number of asset classes with each fund having unique weightings 
allocated to each asset class. These weights impact the fund’s exposure to each asset class which in 
turn give each style a distinctive risk and return profile.  
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Motivated by the contributions of Brown et al. (2009) and Holmes and Faff (2008a) we 
examine whether Australian multi-sector funds are misclassified, and then, having found this to be 
the case, determine if this misclassification has any impact on fund performance. Using a monthly 
sample of Australian funds over the five-year sample period 2003:04-2008:03 we address the 
following research question: Do significant levels of misclassification exist for Australian multi-
sector managed funds and if so what, if any, are the effects on fund performance? We find that a 
significant proportion of funds are misclassified but that no conclusive association is found to exist 
between misclassification and performance.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, a review of the existing 
literature related to misclassification and style analysis is provided. Section III describes the research 
design and managed fund sample. Empirical evidence and a discussion of our results are provided in 
Section IV while a conclusion and suggestions for future research are presented in Section V. 
 
II Prior Studies incorporating Return Based Style Analysis 
In order to provide contextual completeness for this investigation, it is worthwhile presenting a brief 
overview of style analysis. The philosophy or objective that a fund manager uses to make investment 
decisions regarding the securities and asset allocation of a portfolio is known as the managed fund’s 
“style” (Sharpe 1992). Equity fund managers can be classified into different styles based on the 
characteristics of shares that they invest in. Israelson (1999) explains how Morningstar determines 
whether or not an equity fund is classified as large/small value, large/small growth or a combination 
of both, based on an allocated price to earnings ratio and price to book ratio score for each of the 
shares in their portfolio. These ratio and scores are then used to calculate an overall price to earnings 
ratio and price to book ratio score. The scores can then be used to sort funds into their respective 
style classifications. Multi-sector funds however, typically classify themselves into five broad 
categories; income, defensive, conservative, balanced and growth. Each of these “styles” influences 
the asset allocation decision of the respective fund managers in terms of the weightings that each of 
six different asset classes1 receive.  
An illustration of the impact that investment style can have on the behaviour of a multi-sector 
funds is provided by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) using US data for the period 1974-1983. 
In this seminal paper the authors find that the asset allocation decision accounts for 94% of the 
variability of total portfolio returns (Brinson et al 1986, p. 43). Further it was the study first to 
identify asset allocation and therefore style as being a major determinant of portfolio return 
                                                          
1 The six different asset classes are; (1) Australian Equities, (2) International Equities, (3) Listed Property, (4) Australian  
   Fixed Interest, (5) Overseas Fixed Interest and (6) Cash. 
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variability. The findings were supported by Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann (1999), who reach a 
similar conclusion when examining U.K. pension fund data.  
There are a number of methods that an investor can use to accurately determine a managed 
fund’s style without needing to rely on what is stated by the fund in its PDS. One alternative method, 
and method of choice in this paper, involves using historical returns to identify a managed fund’s 
asset allocation. This approach is commonly referred to as “style analysis” and was developed by 
William Sharpe in his seminal papers (Sharpe 1988; 1992). A second alternative, namely “holdings-
based style analysis” is described by Kaplan (2003) as using a bottom up approach wherein the 
fund’s style is determined from the characteristics of the securities that it holds at various points in 
time. As to the effectiveness of the two approaches, ample evidence exists to support the widespread 
use of RBSA as a tool in determining a manager’s effective asset mix. In a study which examined 
3336 US equity funds between 1989 and 1997 Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) compared both 
approaches to style identification and found that in general the two give similar results. In 
opposition, a study by Horst, Nijman, and de Roon (2004) compared the two approaches using 18 
US based funds and found that RBSA gave a better estimate of a fund’s investment style and was 
also better at forecasting future returns. The reason for this is that RBSA tends to be more suited for 
identifying the actual factor exposures that are relevant for predicting future returns and also the risk 
exposure of the fund. Additionally Dor, Budinger, Dynkin, and Leech (2008) point out that RBSA  
main advantage is that it offers timely comparisons, gives analysts the ability to observe intra-period 
shifts in style, and allows for historical time series to be more readily constructed than is possible 
with data from actual portfolio holdings of funds. The main criticisms aimed at RBSA are not 
levelled at the methodology itself, or the theory behind it, but mainly at its application. For RBSA to 
be effective at identifying style it needs to be implemented correctly, with appropriate indices and an 
investment philosophy that is able to be captured by these benchmark indices. This was 
acknowledged by Buetow,  Johnson, and Runkle (2000). The desired characteristics of asset class 
benchmark indices are outlined by Sharpe (1992) who specifies that the indices used should be 
mutually exclusive, exhaustive, have returns that differ, and should therefore have low correlation 
with each other. This avoids a situation where there is confusion about where to allocate a weighting 
due to the returns of two or more indices behaving in a similar way. These conditions are best met 
when investigating multi-sector managed funds whose asset allocation strategies utilise asset classes 
which each have a unique index. For this reason the decision to use RBSA to examine multi-sector 
funds is perhaps the best application of the technique (Buetow et al. 2000). The appropriate indices 
to use for Australian multi-sector managed funds which cover the six target asset classes have been 
identified by Faff, Gallagher, and Wu (2005). In the Faff et al. (2005) study a sample of 80 multi-
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sector funds are investigated in an effort to evaluate the tactical asset allocation capabilities, 
strategies and behaviour of Australian investment managers who invest assets across multiple asset 
classes. By choosing suitable benchmark indices and carefully implementing RBSA, the investment 
analyst will have a clear reading of a managed funds style.  
It is not yet clear why many managed funds are vague about their investment objectives. 
However, there is no shortage of conjecture as to the possible reasons (Chan et al. 2002). One 
proposition is that a fund’s investment objective is intentionally left vague so that there is a degree of 
flexibility that would allow for temporary deviations from the stated style. Attempts to time the 
market by shifting allocation into an asset class that is not dominant may also explain some 
temporary deviations from stated style. Another possible reason is that adverse incentives could exist 
for funds to misclassify themselves in order to make it difficult for investors to be able to accurately 
identify the risk associated with a particular fund’s investment objective. The suspicion that fund 
managers respond to adverse incentive structures in a way which will make their portfolios look 
more attractive to current and potential investors is nothing new (Lakonishok, Armin, Thaler, and 
Vishny 1991), that is not to say however that funds are deliberately misleading investors but that 
they may want to keep certain information to themselves. In doing this fund managers may be able to 
attract investors to their fund by achieving higher relative returns to funds of the same stated style at 
the expense of taking on higher risk. As Dibartolomeo and Witowski (1997, p. 34) phrased it: “the 
easiest way to win a contest for the largest tomato is to paint a cantaloupe red and hope the judges do 
not notice”.   
The majority of empirical evidence surrounding misclassification is US focused. Using 
realised returns from US mutual funds, Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Dibartolomeo and 
Witowski (1997) found consistent results that misclassification within their respective samples was 
as much as 40%. More recently, Kim et al. (2000) found evidence of misclassification in as much as 
50% of the mutual funds examined in their sample taking into account fund attributes and not relying 
on risk and return measures. With such a large proportion of US funds misclassified, the question of 
whether or not there are any negative consequences for investors becomes an important one. This is 
particularly the case in a setting like the Australian market where a high proportion of the population 
are either directly or indirectly involved with investments in managed funds2.  Are investors facing 
significantly different levels of risk? Are they losing diversification benefits? What are the effects of 
misclassification on fund performance? Progress has been made towards finding an answer to these 
                                                          
2 In late 2008, 6.7 million people, or 41% of the adult Australian population, participated in the Australian share market 
either directly (via shares or other listed investments) or indirectly (via superannuation funds). For full details regarding 
participation in the Australian industry refer to 2008 Australian share ownership study (2008 ASX). 
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questions (Brown et al. 2009; Indro, Jiang, Hu, and Lee 1998), but again the literature has been 
primarily focused on equity fund styles without much consideration of multi-sector funds, that are 
popular within the Australian market setting.  
While the bulk of research is on equity funds, multi-sector funds have not been ignored. 
Holmes and Faff (2008b) use rolling windows and style analysis to examine how consistent 
Australian multi-sector fund style weights have been over time. Their technique does not take into 
account whether or not funds have moved outside their mandated ranges for each asset class. It is 
possible that even though there have been large fluctuations in style weights they may be fluctuating 
within the range that investors have implicitly approved of when investing in the fund. This is of 
importance to investors, because if a fund allocates outside its stated range then it is breaking its 
mandate, in other words it is “misclassified”. This misclassification can lead to investors having a 
suboptimal exposure to a particular asset class. These asset class ranges are set with the fund 
manager agreeing to stay within them on average to allow for the flexibility necessary to take 
advantage of any special information or selectivity skill that the manager may possess. As this is the 
case for a large number of funds, strong form RBSA3 is a useful and appropriate technique to use 
when addressing the first part of our research question, which can be answered by testing the 
following hypothesis.  
HA1:  Significant levels of misclassification exist with regards to the investment objective of 
Australian multi-sector managed funds.  
In light of the fact, that we expect to reject the null version of the above hypothesis and find that 
Australian multi-sector funds are indeed misclassified, we then tackle the second part of our research 
question that addresses the association with performance. There is mixed evidence in the literature. 
In the case of equity funds  style inconsistency can negatively impact performance (Brown et al. 
2009), whereas  evidence exists to suggest a positive relationship exists for multi-sector funds 
(Holmes and Faff 2007). In view of the mixed findings we test the following hypothesis to address 
the second part of our research question.  
HA2:  An association exists between misclassification and fund performance. 
The null version of the above hypothesis will be verified in the testing process.   
 
 
                                                          
3 Alternative versions exist of returns based style analysis: weak form, semi strong form and strong form. Weak form 
style analysis is where the coefficients to the benchmarks are estimated in a completely unconstrained fashion. Semi-
strong returns based style analysis assumes that the weights are constrained in that they must sum up to 1, but have no 
non-negativity restriction applied. Strong form returns based style analysis assumes all constraints are satisfied.  
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III Research Design and Data 
Research Design  
Returns based style analysis (RBSA) involves an application of an asset class factor model 
developed by Sharpe (1988; 1992) and introduced in Equation 1.  
itntintitiit eFwFwFwR ++++= ][ 2211 KK                          (Equation 1) 
Rit is the return on fund i in period t, Fnt represents the return of factor n for fundi in which the factors 
are the values of the various asset class index returns and win is the managed fund’s style weight for 
asset class n. The error term ite is the proportion of fund return which is not explained by the 
combination of asset class indices and can therefore be thought of as the selection component of the 
model. To determine the style weights the variance of the error term must be minimized subject to 
the constraints that the weights sum to unity and be non negative. To achieve this Equation 1 can be 
rearranged to solve for the error as follows: 
][ 2211 ntintitiitit FwFwFwRe +++−= KK                (Equation 2) 
On obtaining results from Equation 2, the standard deviation of the error term (selection) can be 
thought of as the tracking error of the fund from its customised passive benchmark portfolio. The 
proportion of variance that can be explained by the fund’s style is obtained from Equation 3. 
)(
)(12
i
i
RVar
eVarR −=                             (Equation 3) 
The right hand side of Equation 3 is equal to 100% minus the proportion of variance unexplained, 
while the left hand side indicates the proportion of variance explained by the n asset classes (Sharpe 
1992). A low R2 can be explained by  either high levels of selection in a fund, a frequent change in 
investment style during a period, or the fund investing in derivatives whose effects cannot be 
captured by any of the indices (Lucas and Riepe 1996). 
RBSA examines historical returns and gives estimates of the fund’s true style weightings. 
Sharpe (1988, pp. 59-69) states in reference to the technique, “returns-based style analysis is not 
going to dissect the creature to determine if its DNA belongs to that of a duck, but it will tell you if it 
has enough duck like characteristics to qualify”. To improve the efficiency of the technique this 
study will apply confidence intervals to the style weights by using the approach developed by 
Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997). Before this approach was developed there was no good measure 
 8
of the quality of fit for the estimated individual style weightings. To implement this technique the 
standard deviations of the estimated style weights are approximated using the following equation: 
1−−×= knBi
a
wi σ
σσ                              (Equation 4) 
In Equation 4, the subscript i represents the index corresponding to the style weight being estimated 
σa is the standard deviation of the style analysis, σBi denotes the “unexplained returns based style 
analysis index volatility” for index i, n the total number of returns used in the style analysis and k the 
number of market indices with non-zero style weights. Bi represents the portion of the returns for 
index i which are not attributable to the other market indices. The standard deviation of this return 
series is known as the “unexplained Sharpe style index volatility”. The confidence interval calculated 
for a style weight on a particular index will (1) increase with the standard error of the style analysis, 
(2) decrease with the number of returns used, and (3) decrease with the independence of the market 
index from the other indices used in the analysis. The practical benefits of having confidence 
intervals are that statements regarding the significance of style weights can be made. This is useful to 
the analysis conducted within this paper as it will allow for greater precision when determining 
whether or not the style weights are outside the fund’s asset allocation range.  
Due to its ability to accurately determine a fund’s investment style, RBSA can also be used to 
evaluate whether the stated style is consistent with what is happening in practice. For example, in the 
case of equity funds it is a matter of examining which index is dominant based on the style weighting 
and then making a comparison with the stated investment objective.  In this paper the task of 
identifying misclassification is more difficult given the emphasis on multi-sector funds. The problem 
is complicated due to fact that each of the five general multi-sector styles (income, defensive, 
conservative, balanced and growth) is comprised of a strategic allocation among six major asset 
classes. There exist dominant indices among these styles and are subject to intersection in terms of a 
balanced and growth fund both having Australian equities as their dominant index. In order to 
determine if a multi-sector fund has been misclassified, a comparison with the fund’s mandated asset 
allocation range for each asset class is necessary. Multi-sector funds like all other fund types disclose 
via their PDS the specific investment strategy. In addition within the PDS it is stated what asset 
classes the fund will invest in and the range that the manager is, on average over the recommended 
investment horizon of the fund, mandated to abide by. These ranges are typically set under the 
premise that a fund manager will adhere to them on average over the fund’s investment horizon, 
unless authorised by a majority of unit holders to deviate from the stated investment policy (Kim et. 
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al. 2000). On the basis of this evidence RBSA is a suitable technique to use to answer the first part of 
the contingent research question.  
The second part of the contingent research question deals with the association between fund 
misclassification and performance. Using RBSA, individual customised benchmarks which represent 
the best linear combination of asset class indices are created for each multi-sector fund within the 
sample. The customised benchmarks are then used to asses each fund’s risk adjusted performance so 
that comparisons can be made between them. To achieve this, the information ratio is calculated for 
each fund. The information ratio (IR) is intended to serve as a measure of the special information that 
an active portfolio reveals through its return (Goodwin 1998). The value added or subtracted through 
active management per unit of added risk for monthly data is given by Equation 5. 
12×= MIRIR                                          (Equation 5) 
MIR refers to the monthly IR and can be found by dividing the monthly mean return by the tracking 
error as shown in Equation 6. 
ie
ieEMIR σ
)(=                   (Equation 6) 
The IR for each fund is then tested for statistical significance using the t-statistic in order to verify 
the null hypothesis for H2. Once the information ratio is calculated for each fund a comparison is 
made between those that are misclassified and those that stayed within the mandated asset allocation 
range. This allows us to determine whether or not the misclassified funds were able to achieve higher 
risk adjusted returns than the correctly classified counterparts. Ascertaining whether any observed 
differences are statistically significant is determined by conducting an independent samples t-test and 
then a Mann-Whitney U test for robustness. 
To test whether a formal relationship exists between misclassification and performance cross 
sectional OLS regression is adopted, refer to Equation 7. 
ii SIZEMERDDDDDy εββββββββ ++++++++= 8756453423121                       (Equation 7) 
To control for any effect that fund style may have, dummy variables for each are included in the 
regression equation. Where D1 =1 for defensive style and 0 otherwise; where D2 =1 for conservative 
style and 0 otherwise; where D3=1 for income style and 0 otherwise; where D4 =1 for growth style 
and 0 otherwise; where D5=1 for misclassified funds and 0 otherwise. To avoid the dummy variables 
leading to a situation of perfect multicollinearity the balanced fund dummy is excluded. As 
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misclassification is determined by examining the result of RBSA, a dummy is included where 1 
represents a fund being misclassified and 0 otherwise.  
Control variables for fund SIZE and management expense ratio (MER) are included in 
Equation 7 to capture any effects that they may have on the findings. Fund size is calculated as the 
natural log of the average fund size over the sample period while the median MER over the sample 
period is used for the explanatory variable. A relationship linking performance to fund size has been 
previously investigated (Gallagher and Martin 2005; Sawicki and Finn 2002). However, no 
consensus has been reached as to the nature of this link with studies finding either an inverse 
relationship or none at all. When including fund size in the regression the effect that it can have on 
MER needs to be explained. There is a documented  inverse relationship between the two which is 
attributed to the effects that economies of scale can have in improving efficiency and reducing costs 
(Geranio and Zanotti 2005; Dowen and Mann 2004). Further to this, Holmes and Faff (2007) 
document a negative relationship with performance, implying that higher MER is not necessarily 
associated with higher skill. 
 
Data 
This paper utilises monthly return data for a total of 246 Australian multi-sector managed funds for 
the period April 2003 to March 20084. Managed fund return data was obtained using Morningstar 
direct (version 3.1.4), with defunct funds excluded. The requirement to remove defunct funds from 
the sample is largely unavoidable because if a fund does not have a complete return history over the 
sample period RBSA cannot be conducted. The sample consists of multi-sector funds split into five 
broad categories: defensive, conservative, income, balanced, and growth. Funds were segmented into 
these categories on the basis of their stated objectives and fund name. In cases where the fund name 
and objective are ambiguous then Morningstar’s classification system was used as a proxy. The 
composition of the sample data is shown in Table 1. Table 1 highlight’s that the majority of funds are 
classified as either growth (40%) or balanced (26%). A possible explanation for this is that during the 
sample period investors were more optimistic than on average due to the strength of the market 
(DotCom boom prior to 2000, credit boom post 2002). The market optimism led to a decrease in the 
popularity of defensive and conservative funds. 
 
 
                                                          
4 The analysis in this paper is based on 5 years of data. Similar studies in the literature have employed 10 years of data.  
RBSA requires at least sixty months of consecutive data for each fund (Sharpe 1992). In the seminal study on 
management style and performance measurement Sharpe investigated a set of open-end mutual funds between 1985 
and 1989. The five-year sample period is sufficient and the findings reported in this paper can therefore be seen to be 
robust and representative. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Managed Fund Sample, April 2003 to March 2008 
Category of Fund Sample 
Size 
Mean Monthly 
Return* 
Std Dev Monthly 
Return* 
Proportion of 
Sample 
Multi-Sector Defensive 32 0.60% 1.01% 13.01% 
Multi-Sector Conservative 27 0.55% 0.90% 10.98% 
Multi-Sector Income 23 0.71% 1.45% 9.35% 
Multi-Sector Balanced 65 0.83% 1.70% 26.42% 
Multi-Sector Growth 99 0.86% 2.03% 40.24% 
*Average values of each fund category 
  
The final sample of funds in this study involved limiting the total population of 3647 
Australian open ended managed funds to those that had an inception date prior to April 2003, were 
classified as multi-sector funds and with a complete data set of monthly returns for the required 
sample period. This reduced the sample to 394 funds.  Additionally, each fund was required to have a 
stated asset allocation range for the asset classes they invest in. This reduced the sample further to a 
final sample of 246 funds5. The asset allocation ranges were obtained from Morningstar Total Access 
database.  
RBSA requires the use of appropriate style indices. For all cases the appropriate benchmark 
indices representative of the broad asset classes that an Australian multi-sector fund would invest in 
are necessary. The desired characteristics of asset class indices are outlined by Sharpe (1992), where 
it is specified that indices used should be: (i) mutually exclusive; (ii) exhaustive; (iii) have returns 
that differ; and (iv) should therefore have low correlation with each other. With these conditions in 
mind and in the spirit of Faff et. al. (2005) the following asset classes/benchmark indicies are 
adopted: Australia DataStream market - accumulation index (AEQ), MSCI World ex AU - 
Accumulation index, $A (IEQ), S&P/ASX 300 property trust index – Accumulation (LP), AU UBS 
Composite Bond Index - All maturities (AFI), CGBI WGBI World Non A$ All Maturities A$ (OFI), 
UBS AU Bank bill index all maturities – Accumulation (CASH). These same indices were used in a 
study of Australian multi-sector funds by Holmes and Faff (2007). The returns for these benchmark 
indices were obtained from the Datastream database for the period from April 2003 to March 2008. 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for the six benchmark indices. It is evident that no two 
asset classes are perfectly correlated providing confidence with the reliability of the analysis. 
Additionally, there exists a lack of options available for selecting an appropriate benchmark for these 
asset classes.  An examination of the descriptive statistics, also presented in Table 2, with respect to 
return and standard deviation illustrate these asset classes are different and therefore appropriate 
within the RBSA. 
 
                                                          
5 148 funds with a full data set of monthly returns were eliminated from our final sample due to insufficient or no 
information being available about the target asset allocation.  
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficients  and Descriptive Statistics between Asset Class Indices 
 AEQ IEQ LP AFI OFI CASH 
AEQ 
IEQ 
LP 
AFI 
OFI 
CASH 
1.00 
0.822 
0.582 
-0.176 
-0.409 
-0.292 
 
1.000 
0.538 
-0.141 
-0.466 
-0.377 
 
 
1.000 
0.195 
0.006 
-0.229 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.491 
0.232 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.301 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
Median Return 
Std. Deviation 
1.39% 
2.88% 
1.07% 
2.72% 
0.84% 
3.84% 
0.39% 
0.67% 
0.00% 
2.57% 
0.48% 
0.06% 
The descriptive statistics presented are for the monthly returns over the sample period April 2003 to March 2008. 
 
IV Empirical Results 
The ability of multi-sector fund managers to remain within their mandated asset class ranges and the 
association that this ability has with their capability to add value is the research question that is 
investigated within this paper. It is an important question that needs to be addressed from the 
perspective of both the individual investor and investment professional.  
In order to address the first part of this question we first implement RBSA by minimising 
Equation 2 using Excel Solver to implement the non-negativity and the unity constraints required to 
perform the quadratic programming. In order to achieve this, six representative asset class indices are 
used to determine the mean style weightings of each fund over the sample period. The style weights 
are then used to break down fund return that represents a linear combination of the asset class style 
indices plus a fund-specific error term. The degree of style and selection are then calculated as shown 
in Equation 3 along with the unexplained RBSA index volatility for each asset class.  
R2 is calculated for each fund following Equation 3. On average over the total sample the amount 
that style contributes to overall return is 88.62%. This finding over the sample period could be due to 
(i) low levels of selection from multi-sector fund managers (ii) or high levels of style consistency. 
Based on the results from this study and previous studies in the literature, we find it unlikely that 
style consistency is the source of the high R2 and attribute the figure to low levels of selection as 
being the likely explanation. A summary of the results of the style analysis is presented in Table 3.  
On average across all funds the most heavily weighted asset classes were AEQ (32.86) and 
IEQ (19.00). A preference towards equity type securities amongst multi-sector fund managers is 
identified. An explanation can be attributed to an over representation of growth and balanced funds 
within the sample. This over representation has created a potential bias towards their respective 
styles that are known to invest more heavily in equities “an equity bias”. Another interesting finding 
is the general lack of investment in the property sector, a surprising result given the strong residential 
and commercial property market in Australia over the period 2003-2008. Aside from property, the 
second least heavily weighted asset class is OFI (10.97) with funds in general looking towards the 
 13
more familiar AFI class of investments (column 5) when including fixed interest assets in their 
portfolio.  
 
Table 3: Mean Style Weightings for Fund Categories 
Fund Category AEQ IEQ LP AFI OFI CASH Style Selectivity
Multi‐Sector Defensive 16.305 11.56 6.147 32.973 6.119 26.896 88.343
N = 32 (4.739) (5.355) (3.431) (13.545) (4.823) (14.463) (12.153)
11.657
Multi‐Sector Conservative 15.633 8.56 4.124 37.207 3.891 30.588 82.588
N = 27 (5.742) (4.955) (2.528) (18.701) (3.387) (20.887) (19.510)
17.412
Multi‐Sector Income 28.983 7.652 6.919 29.171 2.756 24.518 83.447
N = 23 (17.207) (9.247) (6.448) (20.021) (4.189) (22.644) (20.080)
16.553
Multi‐Sector Balanced 37.413 22.622 4.372 13.395 15.504 6.693 92.094
N = 65 (39.099) (6.720) (3.232) (14.275) (7.802) (7.284) (7.602)
7.906
Multi‐Sector Growth 40.813 24.516 6.587 9.175 13.405 5.503 89.263
N = 99 (11.029) (8.488) (4.526) (14.941) (8.792) (12.557) (9.847)
10.737
Total Funds 32.857 19.002 5.705 18.332 10.972 13.131 88.615
N=246 (14.289) (10.081) (4.249) (18.907) (8.680) (17.342) (12.612)
11.385
 
Returns based style analysis was carried out on all 246 funds within the sample. The estimated style weights (presented 
as percentages) calculated for each asset class represent the percentage a fund has allocated to that particular asset class. 
Mean values are reported with standard deviation in parentheses. The amount of return variability attributed to the funds 
style is given as a percentage in the eighth column. Additionally, The variability for selectivity (*) is identical to that for 
style in each case. In this table and all subsequent tables the abbreviations (in brackets) represent Australia DS market - 
accumulation index (AEQ), MSCI World ex AU - Accumulation index, $A (IEQ), S&P/ASX 300 property trust index – 
Accumulation (LP), AU UBS Composite Bond Index - All maturities (AFI), CGBI WGBI World Non A$ All Maturities 
A$ (OFI), UBS AU Bank bill index all mats – Accumulation (CASH). 
 
Table 3 presents an overview of asset allocation across the five multi-sector fund categories. On 
average the role that style plays (refer to style, column 8) in fund return is fairly high among all 
styles with the minimum being 82.59% for funds classified as conservative and the highest is 92.09% 
for balanced funds. This is not a large variation and suggests fund managers tend towards low levels 
of selection regardless of their style. As expected style weightings vary among the different 
investment objectives. An example of this variation is observed with funds that report to adhere to a 
growth objective. Prior expectations would suggest these types of funds, to have higher weightings in 
equities (AEQ and IEQ) than conservative funds, which is confirmed through the style analysis, 
65.3% and 24.1% for growth and conservative respectively. As expected we find and report in Table 
3 weighting similarities for funds with similar objectives such as conservative and defensive funds.  
An unexpected finding is the high degree of similarity between growth and balanced 
categories when looking at their style weights (column 8). The only departure from this observation 
of note is that for AFI. Individual investors who choose to invest their savings in a balanced fund due 
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to a perceived lower exposure to risky assets would be concerned with this finding, as would 
professional advisors who adhere to the prudent investor law.  
Having created Sharpe style weights that allowed for inferences about the multi-sector 
managed fund’s behaviour and composition to be drawn we then derive an approximation for the 
confidence intervals of those weights following Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997). Making use of 
Monte Carlo simulation we are then able to verify the funds capacity to produce an effect under ideal 
conditions. A summary of the results obtained (upper and lower bounds) are presented in Table 4. 
 Previous studies that have evaluated style analysis have tended to use the R2 statistic as a 
measure of goodness of fit (Sharpe 1992). The contribution of Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997) 
extended the literature to cater for a measure of the quality of fit for individual styles by deriving an 
expression that allows for the approximation of confidence intervals on style weights. The 
approximated confidence intervals can be useful in terms of disallowing certain combinations of 
market indices. In cases where indexes to be used to evaluate style are too similar, the confidence 
intervals will be unacceptably large. With reference to Table 4 (confidence intervals reported at a 
95% level of certainty), that in no single case are the intervals found to be excessively wide 
indicating that the indices adopted within the paper are suitable for analysing style for the asset 
classes investigated. The confidence intervals show that the point estimates are relatively precise 
reflections of the portfolio weights. The creation of confidence intervals also allows practitioners to 
determine whether the style weights for each investment objective are significantly different. Our 
findings show that each investment objective is unique in regards to their style weightings. 
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Table 4: Confidence Intervals of Style Weights 
Confidence      Multi‐Sector Defensive   Multi‐Sector Conservative      Multi‐Sector Income    Multi‐Sector Balanced      Multi‐Sector Growth                               Total Funds
Intervals N = 32 N = 27 N = 23 N = 65 N = 99 N = 246
Fund Category Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit
AEQ 16.359 16.252 15.692 15.574 29.063 28.904 37.487 37.339 40.914 40.713 32.938 32.776
( 2.725 ) ( 2.725 ) ( 2.995 ) ( 2.995 ) ( 4.078 ) ( 4.078 ) ( 3.789 ) ( 3.789 ) ( 5.128 ) ( 5.128 ) ( 4.129 ) ( 4.129 )
IEQ 11.614 11.505 8.620 8.501 7.734 7.571 22.698 22.547 24.619 24.414 19.085 18.920
( 2.777 ) ( 2.777 ) ( 3.052 ) ( 3.052 ) ( 4.156 ) ( 4.156 ) ( 3.861 ) ( 3.861 ) ( 5.226 ) ( 5.226 ) ( 4.208 ) ( 4.208 )
LP 6.175 6.119 4.155 4.093 6.961 6.877 4.411 4.333 6.640 6.534 5.748 5.662
( 1.437 ) ( 1.437 ) ( 1.579 ) ( 1.579 ) ( 2.150 ) ( 2.150 ) ( 1.998 ) ( 1.998 ) (2.703) (2.703) (2.177) (2.177)
AFI 33.121 32.825 37.369 37.044 29.393 28.950 13.601 13.190 9.453 8.897 18.556 18.108
( 7.541 ) ( 7.541 ) ( 8.288 ) ( 8.288 ) ( 11.285 ) ( 11.285 ) ( 10.484 ) ( 10.484 ) ( 14.189 ) ( 14.189 ) ( 11.426 ) ( 11.426 )
OFI 6.155 6.083 3.931 3.851 2.811 2.702 15.554 15.454 13.473 13.337 11.027 10.917
( 1.845 ) ( 1.845 ) ( 2.027 ) ( 2.027 ) ( 2.760 ) ( 2.760 ) ( 2.565 ) ( 2.565 ) ( 3.471 ) ( 3.471 ) ( 2.795 ) ( 2.795 )
CASH 27.032 26.760 30.734 30.435 24.721 24.315 6.882 6.505 5.759 5.248 13.337 12.925
( 6.931 ) ( 6.931 ) ( 7.618 ) ( 7.618 ) ( 10.372 ) ( 10.372 ) ( 9.637 ) ( 9.637 ) ( 13.042 ) ( 13.042 ) ( 10.502 ) ( 10.502 )  
In this table the upper limit and lower limit for the estimated style weights are presented for each asset class (at a 95% level of certainty).. Mean confidence intervals are 
reported for each fund style and the standard deviations used to calculate the confidence intervals are presented in parentheses. The standard deviation for style weights are 
approximated following  Lobosco and Dibartolomeo (1997) 
1−−×= knBi
awi σ
σσ where σa represents the standard error of the style analysis, σBi is the unexplained Sharpe 
style index volatility for index i, n is the number of returns used in the style analysis, k the number of market indexes with nonzero style weight and i the index corresponding 
to the style weight being estimated.  
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After performing the RBSA a significant number of funds were identified as being outside of their 
asset allocation range. Table 5 provides a summary of the findings.  
 
Table 5: Composition of Misclassified Funds 
Category of Fund Sample Size Number of Funds 
Misclassified 
Number of Funds as 
Percent of Total 
Misclassified 
Number of Funds as 
Percent of Category 
Multi-Sector – Defensive 
Multi-Sector – Conservative 
Multi-Sector – Income 
Multi-Sector – Balanced 
Multi-Sector – Growth 
Total Sample Size 
32 
27 
23 
65 
99 
246 
19 
20 
14 
58 
78 
189 
10.05% 
10.58% 
7.41% 
30.69% 
41.27% 
100.00% 
59.38% 
74.07% 
60.87% 
89.23% 
78.795 
76.83% 
Returns based style analysis was implemented to determine each managed funds estimated style weights and therefore 
identify which funds invested outside their mandated asset allocation range. A fund is deemed misclassified if it is 
outside its asset allocation range for any asset class. The number of funds misclassified is given as both a percentage of 
the total number of funds misclassified (refer to column 4) and as a percentage of the number of funds misclassified in a 
particular category (refer to column 5).  
 
Out of the 246 funds in the sample 189 or approximately 77% of them were deemed to be 
misclassified. This finding allows us to reject H0 that no significant levels of misclassification exist 
amongst Australian multi-sector managed funds supporting HA1. Growth funds represented the 
category of funds that was identified as containing the greatest number of funds deemed to be 
misclassified (41.27%) with balanced funds coming in at a relatively close second place. When 
looking at the percentages of misclassified funds within each category we identify that balanced 
funds have an almost 90% rate of misclassification. This on the surface appears a high rate (90%) but 
when market conditions are taken into account it makes intuitive sense that this finding holds for the 
sample period investigated, given the bullish nature of the market. Fund managers, as indicated by 
the heavy concentration in equity type securities, overweighted their portfolios in growth assets. On 
the basis of the performance of the Australian all ordinaries market index over the sample period it is 
clear that Australian shares were highly desirable and included within multi-sector fund portfolios at 
the expense of remaining within the mandated fund objective. This is an alarming finding and one 
that will have serious ramifications in the event of a significant market reversal. 
Further examination of dominant indices for misclassified balanced funds was undertaken in 
order to investigate whether or not they were overweight for AEQ. Of the 58 balanced funds 
misclassified 22 were outside their dominant index (AEQ) and of these 21 or 95% were overweight. 
These findings support the previous assertion that balanced funds consistently broke their PDS 
mandate in order to take advantage of higher returns at the expense of exposing investors to higher 
risks and also possibly reducing their exposure to other asset classes through portfolio rebalancing. A 
similar assertion can be made in regard to growth funds which have the second highest percentage of 
 17
misclassification. In total 29 growth funds were overweight in their dominant index. The fund styles 
with the least amount of misclassification among them were income and defensive. Closer 
investigation of each asset class index allowed us to identify the percentage of funds overweighted 
was slightly above those that were underweighted. It follows that these numbers would be fairly 
close together when fund managers overweight a particular asset class; they may have to 
underweight another. In total 91 funds were misclassified in their dominant index with 83 of those 
being overweight, suggesting managers may be attempting to time their fund’s dominant index. How 
significant this finding is to investors is yet to be determined. Are managers who go outside of their 
mandated ranges doing so to take advantage of any special information they may have? Are these 
managers able to use this information or skill to add value? If so should investors really be all that 
concerned about misclassification. To answer these questions an analysis of fund performance is 
necessary.  
To measure performance the information ratio was calculated for each fund. This ratio 
provides a risk adjusted measure that is useful not only for comparing skill across active managers 
but also for measuring a manager’s performance above that attributed to investment style. The 
information ratio is arguably the best single measure of risk adjusted performance available 
(Goodwin 1998).  A top quartile manager will have an information ratio of one half or higher 
according to Grinold and Kahn (1999). Following this evidence only 4 funds out of the 246 funds 
evaluated can be said to have done a good job. Those funds identified as qualifying for the top 
quartile include: one Income classified fund with an information ratio of 1.552 and significant at the 
1% level; two funds with a classification of Balanced with information ratios of 1.081 and 0.937 
respectively and found to be significant at the 5% level; and one fund classified as Growth with an 
information ratio of 0.754 and found to be significant at the 10% level.  
As observed in Table 6 on average Australian multi-sector managed funds have not 
performed well. Not only did they not add any value, but also as the persistence of negative 
information ratios suggests they are on average eroding value. Only 4 funds were found to have 
significantly positive information ratios as opposed to 123 which demonstrated negative 
performance. The implication is that the bets managers make based on their special information or 
skill are not paying off and even in strong market conditions it is difficult to correctly select 
investments which add value over a style-specific benchmark. 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Fund Performance Measured by the Information Ratio 
Multi‐Sector Defensive  Multi‐Sector Conservative Multi‐Sector Income  Multi‐Sector Balanced Multi‐Sector Growth Total Funds
Fund Category N=32 N=27 N=23 N=65 N=99 N=246
No. of positive cases 3 2 5 13 13 36
(0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(1)c (0)a (2)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(1)c (1)a (2)b(1)c
No. of negative cases 29 25 18 52 86 210
(9)a (2)b(1)c (12)a (3)b(0)c (7)a (5)b(1)c (6)a (11)b(4)c (6)a (15)b(10)c (40)a (36)b(16)c
Mean ‐0.782 ‐1.081 ‐0.7432 ‐0.44 ‐0.548 ‐0.627
Std. Deviation 0.662 0.982 0.898 0.568 0.481 0.668
Maximum 0.119 0.488 1.552 1.081 0.754 1.552
Minimum ‐2.608 ‐3.222 ‐2.494 ‐1.883 ‐2.465 ‐3.222  
Descriptive statistics for the performance of funds in aggregate and segmented into their categories are presented in this 
table. The numbers of positive and negative cases are given for each category with the numbers that are statistically 
significant shown in parentheses. The information ratio was calculated by dividing the monthly mean return by the 
tracking error. (a) indicates the number of statistically significant cases at the 1% level, (b) indicates the number of 
statistically significant cases at the 5% level, and (c) indicates the number of statistically significant cases at the 10% 
level. 
 
Different styles adopt different risk and return patterns based on their allocated investments as 
dictated by their unique objectives. Table 6 shows how on average each style of multi-sector fund 
has performed on a risk adjusted basis. It can be seen over the 2003-2008 sample period that 
balanced multi-sector funds (column 5) have been the best performing funds with the highest average 
information ratio of all styles. Of the 13 positive information ratios calculated for this category only 
2 were significant at the 5% level. The only other categories that contain significantly positive 
information ratios are growth (column 6) and income (column 4) with conservative (column 3) 
coming in as the worst performing category with an average information ratio of -1.08, 15 of which 
are significantly negative at the 5% level. When comparing information ratios between styles it is 
important to note that the style with the highest ratio may not be the most suitable as no 
consideration of an investors risk aversion is taken into account. However the fund manager should 
be able to vary the tracking error and maintain the same information ratio on an ex-ante basis. 
Table 7 presents summary statistics for fund performance for both misclassified and correctly 
classified funds. From Table 7 it can be observed that misclassified funds have a higher average 
information ratio indicating that they are outperforming their correctly classified peers. Of the 30 
positive ratios for misclassified funds 3 are significant at the 5% level and 1 at the 10% level. 
Conversely for correctly classified funds 1 out of 6 is significant at the 5% level. What are the 
implications of this finding? Misclassified funds have benefited when all funds are grouped together, 
but when they are segmented into style categories there appears to be no difference. Investors should 
not be concerned about whether fund managers are keeping within their mandated asset class ranges.  
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Table 7: Summary Statistics of Performance for Misclassified and Correctly Classified Funds 
PANEL A: Correctly classified funds
Multi‐Sector Defensive  Multi‐Sector Conservative Multi‐Sector Income  Multi‐Sector Balanced Multi‐Sector Growth Total Funds
Fund Category N=13 N=7 N=9 N=7 N=21 N=57
No. of positive cases 2 0 2 0 2 6
(0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(1)c (0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(1)c
No. of negative cases 11 7 7 7 19 51
(3)a (0)b(1)c (0)a (4)b(1)c (3)a (3)b(1)c (1)a (1)b(0)c (3)a (4)b(3)c (14)a (9)b(5)c
Mean ‐0.655 ‐1.563 ‐0.839 ‐0.703 ‐0.709 ‐0.821*
Std. Deviation 0.645 1.180 1.211 0.457 0.588 0.822
Maximum 0.058 ‐0.400 1.552 ‐0.163 0.222 1.552
Minimum ‐2.262 ‐3.222 ‐2.494 ‐1.407 ‐2.465 ‐3.222
PANEL B: Misclassified funds
Multi‐Sector Defensive  Multi‐Sector Conservative Multi‐Sector Income  Multi‐Sector Balanced Multi‐Sector Growth Total Funds
Fund Category N=19 N=20 N=14 N=58 N=78 N=189
No. of positive cases 1 2 3 13 11 30
(0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(1)c (0)a (2)b(0)c (0)a (0)b(1)c (0)a (2)b(1)c
No. of negative cases 19 18 11 48 67 159
(6)a (2)b(0)c (8)a (2)b(0)c (4)a (2)b(0)c (5)a (10)b(4)c (3)a (11)b(7)c (26)a (27)b(11)c
Mean ‐0.869 ‐0.912 ‐0.682 ‐0.409 ‐0.505 ‐0.568*
Std. Deviation 0.677 0.873 0.673 0.575 0.443 0.604
Maximum 0.119 0.488 0.189 1.081 0.754 1.081
Minimum ‐2.608 ‐2.417 ‐1.881 ‐1.388 ‐1.791 ‐2.608  
Descriptive statistics for the performance of funds in aggregate and segmented into their categories are presented in this 
table. The numbers of positive and negative cases are given for each category with the numbers that are statistically 
significant shown in parentheses. An independent samples T-test was run to test differences in means as well as a Mann-
Whitney U test for Robustness. (a) indicates the number of statistically significant cases at the 1% level, (b) indicates the 
number of statistically significant cases at the 5% level, and (c) indicates the number of statistically significant cases at 
the 10% level. (*) Mean Information ratios are significantly different at 1% level. 
 
The findings presented in Table 7 points to an association between misclassification and 
performance. This relationship had been examined by several researchers with the majority finding 
that performance and misclassification is negatively related. The rationale provided within the 
existing literature is that misclassification can lead to increased portfolio turnover as well as 
increased likelihood asset allocation errors by fund managers (Brown et al., 2009; Gallo and 
Lockwood 1997). In line with popular opinion, the univaraiate analysis presented in Table 7, 
following Holmes and Faff (2007), presents further evidence for Australian multi-sector funds of the 
existence of a positive association between style inconsistency and performance. With this positive 
association in mind a look at whether there is a significant relationship between misclassification, as 
defined in this paper following Kim et al. (2000)  and the amount of value added by an active 
manager is necessary to determine whether or not investors in misclassified funds are benefiting 
from an active managers’ superior information. 
Previous literature on the link between fund size and performance is mixed, finding either no 
relationship or a negative one. Intuitively one might expect that larger funds are more difficult to 
manage based on the difficulty in finding enough good investments to invest in.  However, no 
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significant correlation is found to exist between fund size and performance6. The regression result is 
consistent with the correlation analysis and implies that managers of larger funds are not able to add 
any more value than managers of smaller funds. Along with size, a control for management expense 
ratio was included to take into account the effect of any possible economies of scale that may exist in 
larger funds. Again, no significant correlation was found to exist between the two suggesting that 
fund size does not bring about lower expenses. Interestingly, a significant negative correlation is 
evident between MER and the information ratio. This significant result is found to hold in the cross-
sectional regression analysis with results presented in Table 8. The significant negative correlation 
finding is alarming as it implies that the higher the expense ratio the less is the value a manager adds 
which is opposite of what an investor would hope for and expect. If paying more in management 
expenses does not lead to better performance then why are investors willing to do so? 
The cross-sectional results presented in Table 8 expose the impact that each style category 
has on performance. Out of five, only three are significant: balanced; defensive; and conservative. A 
positive association between risk-adjusted performance and style is evident but only in the case of 
balanced funds. The other significant style categories were negatively related to performance, which 
is not surprising considering that on average they had the lowest information ratios. The findings for 
defensive and conservative fund managers is not surprising given managers for these type of 
categories tend to be more passive by nature with respect to their investment objectives and therefore 
less likely to try to time the market. 
The findings reported in Tables 6 through 8 reject HA2 that an association between 
misclassification and fund performance exists. In other words, this finding does not allows us to 
reject the null version of hypothesis HA2. Thus we conclude that no significant relationship exists 
between misclassification and fund performance providing support for the findings of Brown et al., 
(2009). This insignificant finding between misclassification and performance is consistent with the 
segmented univariate results. As a result investors should generally not be too concerned with 
whether or not a fund manager is able to stay within the mandated ranges because any perceived 
impact that doing so has is only significant when funds are aggregated and no distinction is made 
between investment styles. 
 
                                                          
6 The correlation coefficient between the independent variables and the information ratio (IR) were calculated based on 
Morningstar data provided for fund size (FS) and management expense ratios (MER) for the period from April 2003 to 
March 2008. Fund size is calculated as the natural log of the average fund size over the sample period. MER refers to 
the management expense ratio and is represented by the median MER over the sample period. The correlation found 
for IR and MER was -0.513*; for IR and FS 0.073; and for MER and FS -0.047. (*) identifies that the correlation is 
significant at the 1% level. For robustness Spearman correlation coefficients were calculated with similar findings 
found and thus has not been reported. 
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Table 8: Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Information Ratio  
Independent Variables  
Constant 
 
Multi-Sector: Defensive 
 
Multi-Sector: Conservative 
 
Multi-Sector: Income 
 
Multi-Sector: Growth 
 
Misclassification 
 
Management Expense Ratio (MER) 
 
Fund Size 
 
R2 
0.370** 
(2.129) 
-0.568* 
(-4.413) 
-0.626 * 
(-4.913) 
-0.019 
(1.42) 
-0.053 
(-0.596) 
0.091 
(1.035) 
-0.635* 
(-10.282) 
-0.004 
(-0.224) 
0.394 
Cross-sectional regression results examining the determinants of the amount of value added through active management 
as measured by the information ratio of Australian multi-sector managed funds. 
ii SIZEMERDDDDDy εββββββββ ++++++++= 8756453423121  Where D2 =1 for conservative style and 0 otherwise; Where 
D3=1 for income style and 0 otherwise; Where D4 =1 for growth style and 0 otherwise; Where D5=1 for misclassified 
funds and 0 otherwise. The t-statistic is recorded in parentheses under the estimated coefficient (statistically significant 
coefficients t-statistics are bolded).  (*) denotes significance at 1% level, (**) denotes significance at the 5% level 
 
V  Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
The findings reported in this paper show that significant levels of misclassification exist for 
Australian multi-sector managed funds but that the effect on fund performance is not significant. The 
findings support the concluding remarks of earlier studies, like those of Kim et al. (2000), Brown and 
Goetzmann (1997), and diBartolomeo and Witowski (1997),  that find the current system of 
classification of managed funds on the basis of their stated objectives has significant room for 
improvement. Using RBSA we find that 77% of multi-sector funds, with as much as 89% of 
balanced funds were misclassified over our sample period. Our findings suggest that in the case of 
multi-sector funds the proportion of funds that do not adhere to the reported stated objectives is 
considerably higher than the 50% of equity funds reported in the case of Kim et al. (2000), and 40% 
in the case of diBartolomeo and Witowski (1997). However, we also conclude that despite this 
alarmingly high proportion of funds acting in a manner inconsistent with their stated objectives, there 
is no evidence to support an association between misclassification and performance. The findings in 
this paper add to the literature by demonstrating that whereas in a down market misclassification 
impacts on performance as previously demonstrated in the literature (Brown et al., 2009), we find no 
association between misclassification and performance in an up market. Whether funds deviate from 
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the stated objectives deliberately or accidently if there is no real impact on performance, then what is 
the real damage? The old adage no harm, no fowl springs to mind. 
So what are the implications of misclassification to investors? Should investors simply ignore 
misclassification and give little attention to a funds mandated asset allocation ranges? The answer 
lies somewhere in between. While we find no direct association with performance, misclassification 
can still lead to investors being much more exposed to a particular asset class than they wish to be.  
This paper provides further evidence on the misclassification of funds in a setting different 
from equity funds and provides impetus for future research into better fund classification schemes 
and greater monitoring of fund investments by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority in 
Australia, and other regulatory bodies of a similar ilk in other countries. Additional areas of interest 
worthy of further attention but not investigated within this paper include extending the work of 
Brown et al. (2009) to investigate additional fund types other than equity to determine if the results 
hold once funds are overexposed to certain asset classes in bullish and bearish market conditions. 
However, for now investors and financial advisors can be safe in the knowledge that even though a 
very large percentage of Australian multi-sector managed funds are misclassified, the amount of 
value added by the active managers of these funds has not been adversely affected.  
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